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CONFLICT OF LAWS-STATUS OF FOREIGN STATUTE-NON-RECOGNITION OF
SUPPORT OBLIGATION-The State of California, Department of Mental Hygiene, brought suit in Texas against defendant, a California resident until
his removal to Texas in 1954, to recover money expended by the state in
support of defendant's mother, an incompetent inmate of a California state
institution since 1944. California law requires an adult son to contribute to
his parents' support1 while a similar provision of the Texas law imposes
such an obligation on a parent but not on a child.2 In accordance with the
applicable California statute of limitations,3 the state sued for the monthly
payments which had accrued during the four-year period immediately pre-

Cal. Welfare & Inst. Code Ann. (Deering, 1952) §6650.
Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1952) art. 3196a.
3 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1953) §345.
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ceding the filing of suit. The trial court's judgment for the full amount
claimed was reversed by the court of civil appeals, which held that the enforcement of the claim for the period after defendant moved to Texas
would violate the public policy of Texas, and that the forum's two-year
statute of limitations applied to that portion of the claim maturing before
defendant's removal to Texas. On appeal, held, affirmed in part and reversed in part, three judges dissenting. California cannot by statute impose
a continuing obligation on defendant which will be enforced for the period
after the defendant became domiciled in Texas; but California may recover payments accruing while defendant was a California citizen and
within four years of suit, as the California statute of limitations applies
and maintenance of the suit with judgment for these accrued amounts is not
against the public policy of Texas. California v. Copus, (Tex. 1958)
309 S.W. (2d) 227, cert. den. 356 U.S. 967 (1958).
Until recently the attitude of a state toward support obligations created by the statute of a sister state was manifested by the rule: "No state
will directly enforce a duty to support created by the law of another state."4
That this attitude has undergone a reformation is indicated by the adoption of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act by a majority
of the states, including both Texas and California.5 Nevertheless, in the
principal case the majority reasoned that to enforce the statute for the period after defendant became a resident of Texas would deprive him of
equal protection of the laws. Since Texas law does not impose a comparable support obligation, it was felt that defendant would be denied
equality with other Texas citizens if the California obligation was enforced
against him by the Texas court. 6 This argument, however, apparently fails
to recognize that the constitutional requirement of equal protection applies
only to all persons similarly situated. Defendant, having previously been a
California resident, is not similarly situated with Texas citizens who have
never resided elsewhere and who have never been subject to the laws of
another jurisdiction. Thus for the Texas court to hold defendant liable
for the California support obligation after his removal to Texas would
not seem to constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws. As pointed
out by the dissent, a reasonable classification of defendant under California
law should not become unreasonable merely by virtue of his crossing state
CONFLICT OF LAws REsTATEMENT §458 (1934).
Ehrenzweig, "Interstate Recognition of Support Duties," 42 CALIF. L. REv. 382
(1954); Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1950, Supp. 1957) art. 2328b; Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering,
1953) §1650 et seq. This action could have been ,brought within the terms of the Uniform
Act, but California made no attempt to comply with the act.
6 This same reasoning controlled the decision in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ex
rel. Department of Public Assistance, Mercer County Board of Assistance v. Mong, 160
Ohio St. 455, 117 N.E. (2d) 32 (1954), brought under the Uniform Act. The case is distinguishable from the principal case in that the defendant was not domiciled in the
imposing state when the obligation arose. For a criticism of the basis for the decision,
see 102 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 938 (1954).
4
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lines. 7 Setting aside this constitutional objection, it is clear that a valid judgment for support is not vitiated by the obligor's removal from the state
rendering it. 8 In furtherance of the doctrine of comity, there seems to be
no reason for drawing a distinction for a statutory obligation, and the decision of the Texas court is open to some question. In addition, the legislative policy of Texas as evidenced by adoption of the Uniform Act and
more recently by imposition of a secondary obligation of support upon an
adult son9 would have been effectuated through enforcement of the foreign
statute.10
While a convincing argument can thus be made to justify enforcement
of the California statute by Texas out of comity, a further argument can be
advanced that its enforcement is required by the full faith and credit
clause.U Cases such as the principal case have rarely arisen,12 and consequently this constitutional issue has not been presented for decision. The
Supreme Court has recognized that the term "public acts" as used in the
full faith and credit clause includes statutory enactments,13 and has held
that statutes in certain selected areas are subject to the full faith and credit
requirement. The extent to which the requirement may be broadened is
not certain, but it has been indicated that in cases involving exclusive legislative jurisdiction in the foreign state, the Supreme Court will not uphold
a refusal to enforce the foreign law if the full faith and credit issue is properly raised.14 However, in the principal case both California and Texas
might be recognized as having legislative jurisdiction, and with the exception of the workmen's compensation cases15 the Supreme Court has avoided

Principal case at 235.
s Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. I (1910).
9 Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1956) Prob. Code §423.
10 And see Dainow, "Policy Problems in Conflicts Cases," 35 True. L. REv. 759 (1957),
cited by both the majority and dissent to support the conclusion that the public policy
of Texas did not bar this action.
11 "Full Faith and Credit shall ,be given in each State to the public ·Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S. CoNsr., art. IV, §1. Cf. Tennessee
Coal, I. & R. Co. v. George, 11 Ga. App. 221, 75 S.E. 567 (1912), affd. 233 U.S. 354 (1914),
where it was said that the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution, and the laws
of Congress enacted pursuant thereto, require the courts of the several states to enforce
any transitory cause of action created by a statute of a sister state, not opposed to the
settled policy of the state wherein it is sought to enforce the cause of action.
12 The principal case was a case of first impression in Texas, and the dissent indicated
that it might very well be a case of first impression in the United States. A similar case
came before the Supreme Court of Minnesota, however, in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
v. Tappan, 215 Minn. 22, 9 N.W. (2d) 18 (1943), in which the court decided that the
foreign statute was not applicable to the defendant.
13 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 119 U.S. 615 (1887); Broderick v. Rosner,
294 U.S. 629 (1935); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951); Nadelmann, "Full Faith and
Credit to Judgments and Public Acts," 56 MrcH. L. REv. 33 (1957).
14 Sumner, "The Status of Public Acts in Sister States,'' 3 U.CL.A. L. REv. I (1955).
15 Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932); Magnolia Petroleum
Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943); Industrial Commission of Wisconsin v. McCartin, 330
U.S. 622 (1947).
7
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the choice of law ·problem presented by such a situation.16 Therefore, it
would be difficult to speculate on the success of the full faith and credit
argument if it were presented in the setting of a support case, whatever its
merits may be. It should be noted that the choice of law problem illustrated
by the principal case has not been completely eliminated by the adoption
of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, since the section
of that act which purports to offer a solution is subject to constitutional
attack,17 and some states accordingly have altered it by amendment. To the
extent that this problem will arise in the future, however, current public
policy would seem to call for enforcement of the foreign support statute.

David C. Berg, S.Ed .

•

16 Sumner, "The Status of Public Acts in Sister States," 3 U.C.L.A. L. R.Ev.
17 The controversial provision is §7, which gives the obligee an election to

I (1955).
claim a
duty of support imposed by the law of the state where the obligor was present during
the period for which support is sought, or by the law of the state where the obligee was
present when the failure to support commenced. For a discussion of the constitutionality
of this provision, see Brockelbank, "Is the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act Constitutional?" 31 ORE. L. R.Ev. 97 (1952).

